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III.

JURISDICTION

This appeal is taken from an Order granting Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment entered on April 20, 2007, in the Third Judicial District Court by the Honorable
John Paul Kennedy. This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Section 78-2a3 (2) (j) of the Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.
IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD(S) OF REVIEW
A.

Issues
1.

Did the trial court commit reversible error granting Defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment when the Court ruled there was no evidence of causation presented
by Plaintiff.
2.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in granting Defendants' Motion

for Summary Judgment when the Court ruled the statements made by Ruth Scott prior to
her death were inadmissible hearsay.
B.

Standard of Review
"On review of a summary judgment... the party against whom the judgment has
been granted is entitled to have all the facts presented, and all the inferences fairly
arising therefrom, considered in a light most favorable to him." Winegar v.
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). An appellate court accords no deference
1

to a trial court's legal conclusions given to support the grant of summary
judgment, but reviews them for correctness." Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc.,
814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991).
V. THE ISSUES ON APPEAL WERE PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT
The issues on appeal were preserved in the trial court, to the extent possible in
Plaintiffs Objection and Memorandum to Defendant HK Contractors Motion for
Summary Judgment (Rec 184-197); Plaintiffs Amended Objection and Memorandum
to Defendant HK Contractors Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec 242-247); Plaintiffs
Memorandum opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. 327-352);
Plaintiffs' Memorandum Regarding Causation Evidence and Hearsay (Rec 363-374; oral
argument advanced by Plaintiff in opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment; and Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal, appealing the Third District Court's Ruling
and Order granting summary judgment in Defendants' favor (Rec. 427-430).
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case; Course of Proceedings & Disposition in Court Below.
This case arises out of an automobile accident in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Appellant Ruth Scott was operating a motor vehicle on November 18, 2002. Mrs. Scott
approached a construction site and became confused about which way to travel through
the site. Plaintiffs allege the site was negligently designed for the flow of traffic,
confusing, and negligently maintained for the safe travel of vehicles through the site.
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Plaintiffs submitted evidence of other persons traveling through the site who
indicated the site was poorly maintained, construction barrels, etc. were knocked over,
and it was confusing about which way to travel through the site.
Defendant HK Contractors filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on March 2,
2006. (Rec. 135) Defendant Utah Barricade filed a joinder in HK Contractors Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Rec 173). Plaintiff and Defendant Utah Barricade later entered into
a settlement agreement and Utah Barricade was dismissed from the action.
Plaintiffs filed an Objection and Memorandum to Defendants Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Rec 184)
Plaintiffs filed an Amended Objection and Memorandum to Defendant HK
Contractors Motion for Summary Judgment. (Rec 242)
Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Supplemental Reply.
(Rec 327)
Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum Regarding Causation Evidence and Hearsay. (Rec
363)
Plaintiffs filed a Supplement to Memorandum Regarding Causation and Hearsay.
(Rec 383)
Oral arguments were held on October 30, 2006, and April 6, 2007.
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The Trial Court granted Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment. Plaintiff
appealed the Trial Court's ruling on May 17, 2007.
B.

Statement of the Facts.
Appellant Ruth Scott was operating a motor vehicle on November 18, 2002. Ms.

Scott approached a construction site and became confused about which way to travel
through the site. Ruth Scott became confused and drove the wrong direction in the
construction site and drove into a hole. She was taken to the emergency room. Soon
after she lapsed into a coma and never regained the capacity to communicate after that
first few hours in the hospital. Ruth Scott died about six months later.
Plaintiffs allege the site was negligently designed for the flow of traffic, confusing,
and negligently maintained for the safe travel of vehicles through the site.
Specifically, one of Plaintiffs witnesses, Larry Griffith, has over twenty years
experience in dealing with construction sites and the implementation of safety plans on
sites. (Rec. 3 33-335) Mr. Griffiths also had daily visits through the very site where Ruth
Scott was injured. Mr. Griffiths indicated flagmen were needed at the site. Mr. Griffiths
indicated the construction site was consistently in disarray and he had one more than one
occasion headed for the conduit and had to reverse. (Rec. 347-348). Mr. Griffiths also
stated the following:
a.

Based on the setup of the construction site I was not at all
surprised to see that there had been an accident.
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b.

In my opinion the protection procedures at the construction site
were grossly inadequate.

c.

I recall there being few cones or barrels and very little was done to
guide traffic through the site.

d.

I myself on more than one occasion found myself going the wrong
way and had to correct myself to avoid entering into the ditch.

(Rec 194-195).
Plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of James Boulton. (Rec. 188-189) Mr. Boulton
stated he personally traveled through the location and witnessed the location where Mrs.
Scott's accident occurred. (Rec. 188). Mr. Boulton further stated as follows:
a. In my opinion the barrels that were set to protect the public were spread too far
apart.
b. To my recollection I do not recall seeing any flag people at this particular
construction site.
c. I also recall the majority of the time the orange barrels that were supposed to
help protect people were knocked over. I know this as I drove thought this
construction site two or three times a day.
d. In my opinion, very little was done to protect the public and ensure safety
around this particular construction site. (Rec. 188-189)
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Plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of George Peters. (Rec. 191-192). George Peters
stated he personally drove though the site on a regular basis. (Rec. 191). George Peters
stated the following:
a.

The accident was completely avoidable had proper safety measures been
taken.

b.

I recall the barricades at this site being spaced so far apart that a car could
very easily pass between them and not know they were going in the
wrong direction.

c.

I recall the hole across the roadway being completely exposed without
anyone giving directions.

d.

I do not believe proper safety measures were put in place to protect the
public as I did not see anything at the site that warranted safety or
concern for drivers. (Rec 191-192)

Ruth Scott was taken to the emergency room. Her husband Doug Scott arrived at
approximately 3:00 pm. During that time Doug Scott had several short conversations
with Ruth Scott. During the first conversation Doug asked her what happened regarding
the accident. Ruth Scott stated that she was confused about which way to travel though
the construction area. Shortly after this Ruth Scott was taken to x-ray. Sometime around
5:00 p.m. Ruth Scott went into respiratory failure. After the respiratory failure, Ruth
Scott was in a coma for some time.

6

After the coma, Ruth Scott never regained capacity sufficient to
communicate. Ruth Scott was never again coherent after the night of admission.
(Rec 374).
Ruth Scott's daughter Lynda Allred saw Ruth Scott at the Hospital on the
day of the accident. Ruth did not know her own daughter. Lynda tried to
communicate with Ruth but she was never coherent after the night of admission.
(Rec. 368)
Ruth Scott's daughter Pamela Scott saw Ruth Scott at the Hospital on the
day of the accident. Ruth did not know her own daughter. Pam tried to
communicate with Ruth but she was never coherent after the night of admission.
(Rec. 370)
VII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Summary judgment is generally inappropriate to resolve claims of negligence and,
in particular, issues concerning damages, which are usually left to the exclusive province
of the jury. In the present case, Plaintiff has presented a prima facie case of negligence
against Defendants with respect to all elements of her claim, including the issue of
causation. At a minimum, issues of fact exist with respect to Plaintiffs negligence claim
that preclude the entry of summary judgment as a matter of law.
The trial court erred in ruling that Plaintiffs had not submitted any evidence
regarding causation. The trial court further erred in ruling that the statements made by
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Ruth Scott just after her accident and prior to her becoming incapacitated was
inadmissible hearsay.
Plaintiffs submitted six affidavits (George Peters, James Boulton, Larry Griffiths,
Doug Scott, Lynda Allred, Pamela Scott and the deposition of Larry Griffiths in support
of Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Appellant Ruth Scott was operating a motor vehicle on November 18, 2002. Ms.
Scott approached a construction site and became confused about which way to travel
through the site. Ruth Scott became confused and drove the wrong direction in the
construction site and drove into a hole. She was taken to the emergency room.
Plaintiffs allegations of negligence are that the Construction site was improperly
designed and maintained; this improper design and maintenance caused travelers through
the construction site to become confused; Ruth Scott became confused traveling through
the construction site and drove into a hole.
Further, the statements made by Ruth Scott after the accident and prior to her
incapacity were riot inadmissible hearsay. Ruth Scott had a conversation with her
husband immediately after the accident. During this conversation she stated she was
confused when she entered the construction site. After this conversation Ruth Scott went
into respirator failure and never regained confidence.
Plaintiffs argue the statement is admissible hearsay based on (1) Present
sense impression; and (2) Excited Utterance.
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Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and its Order should be
reversed.
VIII. ARGUMENT
A

Judgment Have Not Been Met.

In the present case, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the groimds that
• 'ntiff failed to establish a cai isal coi mectioi 1 betw een the defendants' breaches of the
standard of care and her injuries and damages.
Inasmucli as llle Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was brought on the
issue of causation only, and the trial court found that Plaintiff had met her burden with
respect to causation, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should have been
denied.
Summary judgment is generally inappropriate to resolve claims of negligence and
should be employed oi ily ii i ll le most clear-cut case, White v. Deseelhorst 879 P.2d 1371
(Utah 1994). With respect to the burden of proof, this Court has stated, "it only takes one
sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy
and create an issue of fact." Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1282, 1292
(Utah App. 1996). In the present case, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendants in spite of clear and unequivocal testimony, by both deposition and
affidavit, that the defendants' many breaches of th
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nplicable standard of care in the

design and maintenance of the construction site which proximately caused injury and
damage to the plaintiff.
Under Utah law, a negligence claim requires the plaintiff to establish four elements:
" . . . that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty; that defendant breached the duty; that
the breach of the duty was the proximate cause of Plaintiff s injury; and that there was in
fact injury." Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corporation, 820 P.2d 482 (Utah App.).
In the present case, Plaintiffs have met each and every one of these elements. It is
also well established that there can be more than one proximate cause of the same injury.
Id.
The fact and expert testimony on record in this case (particularly when viewed in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff) create, at a minimum, material issues of fact with
regard to causation. These issues of fact must be determined by a jury and necessarily
preclude the entry of summary judgment in this case. Based upon the foregoing, the trial
court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants should be reversed.
Appellant Ruth Scott was operating a motor vehicle on November 18, 2002. Ms.
Scott approached a construction site and became confused about which way to travel
through the site. Ruth Scott became confused and drove the wrong direction in the
construction site and drove into a hole. She was taken to the emergency room. Soon
after she lapsed into a coma and never regained the capacity to communicate after that
first few hours in the hospital. Ruth Scott died about six months later.
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Plaintiffs allege the site was negligently designed for the flow of traffic, confusing,
and negligently maintained for the safe travel of vehicles through the site.
Specifically, one of Plaintiffs witnesses, Larry Griffith, has over twenty years
experience in dealing with construction sites and the implementation of safety plans on
sites. (R ec. 333-335). Mr. Griffiths also 1 u id daily visits **•• • ;h the very site R i ith Scott
was injured in. Mr. Griffiths indicated flagmen were needed at the site. Mr. Griffiths
indicated the construction site was consistently in disarray and he had on more than one
occasion was headed for the conduit and had to reverse. (Rec. 347-348). Mr, Griffiths
also stated the following:
e.

Based on the setup of the construction site I was not at all
surprised to see that there had been an accident.

f.

In my opinion the protection procedures at the construction site
were grossly inadequate.

g.

I recall there being few cones or barrels and very little was done to
guide traffic through the site.

h.

I myself on more than one occasion found myself going the wrong
way and 1 lad to correct myself to avoid entering into the ditch.

(Rec. 194-195)
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Plaintiff submitted the affidavit of James Boulton. (Rec. 188-189) Mr. Boulton
stated he personally traveled through the location and witnessed the location where Mrs.
Scott's accident occurred. (Rec. 188). Mr. Boulton further stated as follows:
e. In my opinion the barrels that were set to protect the public were spread too far
apart.
f. To my recollection I do not recall seeing any flag people at this particular
construction site.
g. I also recall the majority of the time the orange barrels that were supposed to
help protect people were knocked over. I know this as I drove thought this
construction site two or three times a day.
h. In my opinion, very little was done to protect the public and ensure safety
around this particular construction site. (Rec. 188-189)
Plaintiff submitted the affidavit of George Peters. (Rec. 191-192). George Peters
stated he personally drove though the site on a regular basis. (Rec. 191) George Peters
stated the following:
e.

The accident was completely avoidable had proper safety measures been
taken.

f.

I recall the barricades at this site being spaced so far apart that a car could
very easily pass between them and not know there were going in the
wrong direction.
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g.

I recall the hole across the roadway being completely exposed without
anyone giving directions,

h.

T do not believe proper safety measures were pul in place to prolccl the
public, as I

not see anything at the site that warranted safety or

concern for drivers. (Rec. 191-192)
Defendants position was that a traffic control plan had been implemented and
adopted, and the traffic control plan complied with the Manual on Uniform Traffic
Control Devices and local and state law requirements. (Rec. 136)

Defendants further

argue Doug Coleman, as part of his job duties with Utah Barricade periodically visited
the project site to confirm that the traffic control plan was implemented in accord with
Mr. Paxman's plans. (Rec. 138)
Plaintiff, however, submitted three affidavits and the deposition of Larry Griffiths.
The affidavits and the deposition create a disputed issue of material fact The affidavits
state the construction site was confusing, barrels \N etc I nocked over, it was not clear in
which direction to go, and in several instances other persons drove in the wrong direction.
Furthermore, the deceased had a conversation with her husband directly after the accident
whereby she stated she was confused when she erv • *; me construction site.
These affidavits and statement by the deceased create a dispute about whether the
construction site was confusing

:

'-untamed.
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Summary judgment is proper only when "the pleadings, depositions, affidavits,
and admissions show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. " Billings ex rel. Billings v. Union
Bankers Ins. Co., 819 P.2d 803 (Utah 1991).
Based on the affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs, there are genuine issues of material
fact, and therefore, summary judgment is not proper.
Further, the movant must show that there is no "reasonable possibility" that
Plaintiff "could win if given a trial. " Judkins v. Toone, 27 Utah 2d 17, 492 P.2d 980
(1972). To prevail against a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party only
needs to make allegations, which if true, would entitle it to judgment. Rich v. McGovern,
551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1976).
In Harline v. Barker. 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996), the Supreme Court stated,
Proximate Cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence produces the
injury and without which the result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause - the
one that necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury.
The issue of proximate cause should be taken from the jury only where 1) there is
no evidence to establish a causal connection, thus leaving causation to jury speculation, or
2) where reasonable persons could not differ on the inferences to be derived from the
evidence on proximate causation. Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp. 820 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991), aff d 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993).
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in uie present matter, the trial court found that because there were many possible
explanations as to why Mrs. Scott was confused, the causation element was not satisfied
and sumn lary judgn lei it appropriate. II le trial court judge even cai i le i lp witl 1 alternative
reasons why Mrs. Scott drove into the hole. For instance, the court stated "why isn't it
more probable that the sun shone in her eyes or she had dust in her eyes?" (Rec. 450 pg
78).
However, the Coi n t of Appeals in Rose v. Provo City. 67 P.3d 1 01 "7 (Ct App 2003)
came to the opposite conclusion in a case with similar facts as the present case. In Rose v.
Provo City, the Court analyzed evidence regarding an accident involving a bicyclist, and the
possible explanations for the bicyclist's "distribution of attention." The Court of Appeals
found that "because reasonable persons could...differ on the inferences to be derived from
the evidence on pi "oxii i tate causation. Steffensen. 820 P.2dat 487, we coi icli ide proximate
cause present[s] a jury question."
Under the Rose v. Provo City ruling, there are clearly disputed facts regarding
causation. Therefore, the trial court improperly granted the Defendants summary
judgn let it.

Final n . i defendants have not shown that there is no reasoi mble possibility that
Plaintiffs could win if given a trial. Furthermore, Plaintiffs would be entitled to judgment
if the allegations Plaintiffs made are true. Therefore, summary judgment is not proper.

15

B, The Court erred in ruling the statements made by Ruth Scott are inadmissible
hearsay.
The statement made by the deceased, Ruth Scott, directly after the accident and to
her husband is admissible hearsay under two separate exceptions to the hearsay rule: Ut.
R. Evid. 803(1) present sense impression and 803(2) excited utterance. The statement
also is admissible under Ut. R. Evid. 807, the residual or "catchall" exception.
First, the statement by Ruth Scott is a Present Sense Impression.
Rule 803: Hearsay Exceptions; availability of the declarant immaterial - states as
follows:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule...
(1)

Present Sense Impression. A Statement describing or explaining an
even or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or
condition or immediately thereafter.

In the present action, Ruth Scott, within less than two hours of the accident, made
a statement to her husband that she was confused about which way to travel through the
construction site. The statement by Ruth Scott is a present sense impression as it
describes the even of traveling through the construction site and was made immediately
after the event.
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Rule 803: Hearsay Exceptions; availability of the declarant immaterial - states as
follows:
I lie following are not excluded by the hearsay rule...
(2)

Excited \ Jtterance. A Statemei it relatii lg to a startlii lg e\ ei it 01 : 01 idition
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by
the event or condition.

In the present action, Ruth Scott, within less than two hours of the accident, made
a statement to her husband that she was confused about which way to travel through the
construction site. The statement by R 1 it! 1 Scott is an excited utterance as it desci ibes tl ic
even of traveling through the construction site and was made immediately after the event.
In State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah), tl lie Si lprei i le Coi irt analyzed excited
utterance. The Court stated:

I. EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPT

THE HEAR

RULE

Out-of-court declarations offered for the truth of the matter asserted
are inadmissible as hearsay unless they fit within one of the
established exceptions to the hearsay rule. Utah R.Evid. 801-803.
Exceptions to the hearsay rule are based on factors that provide
assurances of testimonial reliability sufficient to dispense with the
usual means of purging testimony of error and falsehood, i.e., the oath,
cross-examination, and the trier of fact's assessment of the declarant's
veracity.
Rule 803 establishes the "excited utterance" exception to the hearsay
rule and defines an excited utterance as "[a] statement relating to a
startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." Under this
exception, three conditions must be met to allow an out-of-court
17

excited utterance into evidence. State v. Cude, 784 P.2d 1197, 1200
(Utah 1989). First, an "event or condition" must occur that is
sufficiently startling to cause an excitement that stills normal
reflective thought processes. Second, the declarant's declaration must
be a spontaneous reaction to the event or condition, not the result of
reflective thought. Third, the utterance must relate to the startling
event. Id.; see also State v. Thomas, 111 P.2d 445, 449 (Utah 1990).
The generally accepted rationale for the exception is that declarations
made during a state of excitement temporarily still a declarant's
capacity to reflect and thereby produce *240 utterances free of
conscious fabrication. FN1 Cude, 784 P.2d at 1199-1200; see also John
W. Strong et al., McCormickon Evidence § 272 (4th ed. 1992).
Usually the most difficult issue in determining the admissibility of an
excited utterance is whether the statement was uttered with a
spontaneity produced by emotional excitement to a degree that
provides a warrant of trustworthiness. The determination requires an
evaluation of a variety of factors, including the nature of the startling
event and the intensity of the excitement or other emotional effect on
the declarant. FN2 The statement need not be strictly contemporaneous
with the startling event to be spontaneous, as is the case with the
"present sense impression" exception, see Rule 803(1), but the
justification for the exception disappears as the emotional excitement
of the declarant subsides and the declarant's capacity for reflection
revives. Thus, although the utterance need not be contemporaneous
with the event, temporal proximity is a factor to be considered. State v.
Wetzel 868 P.2d 64, 69 (Utah 1993).
It is not enough, however, to meet the requirements of the exception
that a declarant merely be subject to a degree of aroused emotion
produced by the startling event when a hearsay declaration is made.
Some emotional states, such as fear, embarrassment, and shock, that
are produced by a traumatic event may have a long-term, even a
lifetime, emotional impact of some degree, but attenuated, lingering
after-effects of shock, excitement, or fear cannot justify the admission
of an oul-of-court declaration made long after a startling or traumatic
event. Statements made in such circumstances have no greater warrant
of reliability than hearsay statements generally.
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The statement made by Ruth Scott is an excited utterance according to the factors
of State v. Smith. See id.
First, the event (the accident) was sufficiently startling to cause excitement that
stilled Ruth Scott's normal reflective thought process. According to Doug Scott he asked
R i ill: 1 Scott what I lappened ii ni i lediately i lpon his arrival at 1 1 ic I lospital, w .1.1:1 101 il
hesitation, discussion, or reflection, Ruth Scott stated she was confused about which way
to travel through the construction site.
Second, Ruth Scott's statement was a spontaneous reaction to the circumstances of
the accident. The aftermath of the accident including the accident itself, extraction from
the hole, the ride in the ambulance, the admission to the Hospital, the attendance by
doctors, was so intensive for a 77 year old woman that there was no time for reflective
thought.
Finally, the statement by Ruth Scott directly related to the startling event. Mrs.
Scott told her husband she was confused about which way to drive through the
construction site.
The rationale behind the excited utterance exception is that statements made by the
declarant under the excitement of a startling event have a greater degree of
trustworthiness. Ruth Scott's statement was made immediately after and extremely
violent and traumatic accident. The statement directly involved the circumstances
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surrounding the accident and the statement was not based on reflective thought or
discussion and analysis between Doug Scott and Ruth Scott.
Third, the statement made by Ruth Scott is admissible under Ut. R. Evid. 807
(formerly 803(24)), the "catch-all" exception.
The residual or "catch-all" exception to the hearsay rule does not apply to a
particular class or type of statement, but was intended for use in those rare cases where,
although out-of-court statement does not fit into recognized hearsay exception, its
admission is justified by inherent reliability of statement and need for its admission.
Rules of Evid., Rule 803(24). State v. Nelson. 777 P.2d 479 Utah,1989.

Proper inquiry into whether hearsay bears circumstantial guaranties of trustworthiness
equivalent to the trustworthiness inherent in the established hearsay exceptions and, thus,
be admissible under one of the residual exceptions, includes: (1) analysis of the probable
motivation of the declarant in making the statement; (2) circumstances under which it
was made; (3) knowledge and qualifications of the declarant; (4) character of the
declarant for truthfulness and honesty and the availability of evidence on the issue; (5)
whether the statement was given voluntarily, under oath, subject to cross examination and
a penalty for perjury; (6) extent to which the declarant's statement reflects his personal
knowledge; (7) whether the declarant ever recanted his statement; and (8) whether the
declarant's statement was insufficiently corroborated. State v. Webster. 32 P.3d 976
(Utah .App. 2001).
The analysis of the Webster factors is as follows:
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1. Mrs. Scott's motivation in making the statement was simply to answer her
husband's question.

The question wasn't leading, and there was no discussion

beforehand.
2. The circumstances under which the statement was made were highly stressful.
Mrs. Scott, a 77-year old woman, was lying injured in a hospital bed having just driven
her car into a hole.
3. Mrs. Scott had firsthand knowledge of the matters she was speaking about, as she
was the one who was confused by the construction site and drove into the hole.
4. Lynda Allred, Pamela Scott and Doug Scott all testified that Ruth Scott was
competent to operate an automobile, alert, active and possessed a valid drivers license.
All three testified Ruth Scott was a very competent and careful driver and had been her
entire life.
5.

Mrs. Scott voluntarily made the statement to her husband from her hospital

bed. Mrs. Scott was not coerced. She merely answered a simple question from her
husband.
6.

Mrs. Scott had firsthand knowledge of the matters she was speaking about,

as she was the one who was confused by the construction site and drove into the hole.
7.

Mrs. Scott at not time recanted the statement that she was confused about

driving through the construction site.
8.

Mrs. Scott's statement was clearly corroborated by three different affiants,

who testified that the construction site was confusing. These witnesses drove through the
construction site on a regular basis. One witness on several occasions took a wrong route
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through the construction site due to the confusing set up, as did Mrs. Scott.
Therefore, under the factors set forth by the Utah Supreme Court, Mrs. Scott's
statement is admissible under Rule 807.
IX. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs respectfully assert that the standards required
for summary judgment have not been met; that the trial court erred in the burden of proof
it required of Plaintiffs and that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in
favor of the Defendants. Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence of causation to
survive summary judgment and, at a minimum, when the evidence is construed in a light
most favorable to the Plaintiffs, there are material issues of fact that preclude the entry of
summary judgment in this matter. Further, the trial court erred in ruling that Ruth Scott's
statements were inadmissible hearsay. Accordingly, Plaintiff hereby requests that the
trial court's Order granting Summary Judgment in favor of Defendants be reversed.
DATED this

/y

day of February, 2007.

LAW OFFICES OF BOND & BOND

JUS™ C. BOND
torney for Plaintiff/Appellant Doug Scott

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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day of February, 2008,1 caused a true and correct

copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to be served, via first class mail postage
prepaid, upon the following:

Terry Plant
Plant Christensen & Kanell
136 South Temple, Ste. 1700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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